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ABSTRACT 
To adjust performance to ensure the success of a task and prevent error, it is necessary to 
anticipate, identify and respond to variations in the work system. The objectives of this study were 
to develop a framework for the analysis of signals, which provide an indication of variations in the 
system, in the healthcare environment and qualitatively investigate signals in the context of 
community-based patient discharge. In addition to the signals, both traditional (Safety-I) and 
proactive safety (Safety-II) elements were investigated with six expert groups, from the field of 
community-based patient discharge. The signals identified and the safety elements were analysed 
using the SEIPS 2.0 model. The sources of the signals were identified as originating from work 
system elements. The proposed framework and method provide a preliminary basis for the 
investigation of signals and assists in highlighting the role that these can play in safety behaviour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare can be described as a complex socio-technical system (Braithwaite, Clay-Williams, Nugus, & Plumb, 
2013; Buckle, Clarkson, Coleman, Ward, & Anderson, 2006; Carayon & Friesdorf, 2006; Janowitz, Gillen, 
Ryan, Rempel, Trupin, Swig, Mullen, Rugulies & Blanc, 2006), which due to the rapidly changing and dynamic 
environment, exhibits properties of emergence, adaptation and self-organization (Braithwaite et al., 2013). 
Emergent behaviours result as numerous tasks require a more improvised response due to the unpredictable 
nature and the unanticipated events that comprise the daily routine in this field (Braithwaite et al., 2013; Kerfoot, 
2004). As a result of the work and system nature of the healthcare environment, safety in this context not only 
refers to the safety of the workers but more predominantly to the safety of the patients. Patient safety can be 
effected by errors (Ahmed, Adam, & Al-Moniem, 2011), which can then potentially lead to adverse incidents or 
events (Brown, Hofer, Johal, Thomson, Nicholl, Franklin & Lilford, 2008). Additionally numerous factors, 
including organisational factors (Johnson, 2004) affect patient safety and therefore it is key to look at patient 
safety from a system’s perspective.  
Research in healthcare will benefit from adopting not only the traditional definition of safety but the more 
recently developed definition of Safety-II. The concept of safety has recently been expanded to include both a 
definition of an absence of harm, whereby the number of adverse events is as low as acceptably possible labelled 
as Safety-I (Hollnagel, 2014), as well as a definition that focuses on the ability to succeed under varying 
conditions, labelled Safety-II (Hollnagel, 2014). One element of Safety-II is the ability to adjust performance to 
ensure success of the task and this requires anticipating, identifying and responding to signals indicating changes 
in the system (Hollnagel, 2014). Signals can be defined as sensed information regarding emerging events 
(Ansoff & Mcdonnell, 1990), and include indicators or cues from the environment (Rasmussen, 1983) which 
require interpretation and sense-making (Weick, 1995). The strength of these signals can vary resulting in 
different requirements regarding interpretation and abilities of sense-making. Strong signals provide a specific 
indication and are more readily recognized (Guillaume, 2011) whereas weak signals are often vague in nature 
(Ansoff & Mcdonnell, 1990), and need to be actively sought out and created by processing interrelated existing 
events, prior knowledge and future expectations in order to understand the information they provide (Macrae, 
2014a). Through the early detection of unexpected events, they may be addressed in a more cost-effective and 
timely manner (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007), but failure to notice the warning signs may result in the risks being 
normalised, and remaining dormant until an adverse event occurs (Macrae, 2014a, 2014b).   
Weak signals may provide an opportunity to achieve proactiveness through the required awareness, monitoring 
and constant vigilance needed for the identification of these signals and the up-to-date information regarding 
ongoing operations they provide (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). Effective risk management requires continuous 
identification and addressing the problems that threaten safety (Macrae, 2014b) and identifying weak signals 
may offer means of reducing risk and responding to hazards earlier. This highlights the role that weak signals 
can play in safety behaviour. Despite accident reports increasingly stating signals were present prior to an 
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incident that would have altered the course of the event if they had been acted upon, research exploring weak 
signals and the role they may play in safety, especially in healthcare, is limited.  
The aims of this research were two-fold, namely develop a conceptual framework for the investigation of weak 
signals in the healthcare environment and to explore both Safety-I and Safety-II elements in the environment. 
The results in this paper include the developing conceptual model as well as the results from the first case study. 
METHOD 
Framework 
To develop an integrated framework, literature was drawn from different fields to develop a conceptual 
framework for the investigation of weak signals to be assessed in upcoming case studies.  The framework was 
developed for the analysis of weak signals in the context of the work, actions and events in the system in which 
they occur, specific for the healthcare context. This framework was developed based on literature from strategic 
management theory (Ansoff & Mcdonnell, 1990), systems ergonomics (Holden et al., 2013; Karsh et al., 2006), 
naturalistic decision making theory (Zsambok & Klein, 1997), the work on weak signals by Macrae (2014a), as 
well as the work on error by Rasmussen (1983) and Reason (1991). It is aimed through the use of different case 
studies conducted within the healthcare context, that the model will be verified and expanded on. The aim of the 
framework is to enhance the understanding of signals, specifically where they may originate and how they may 
be manifested specifically in healthcare, which will aid the development of training and tools utilising weak 
signals. 
Research Design 
An explorative qualitative method was adopted to investigate aspects that lead to performance failure and 
success as well as weak signals within the community-based patient discharge field using a focus group 
methodology. This qualitative approach was adopted due to the fuzzy nature of weak signals and as the field of 
Safety-II is still emerging. The focus groups drew upon the experience of the staff involved in the discharge 
process for patient discharge into the community to investigate why discharges fail, could the failure be 
prevented and the characteristics that ensure that the discharge is a success. A total of 6 focus groups across three 
directorates of the Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust were conducted.  
Participant Characteristics 
A total of 39 participants to part across the six focus groups. For five of the six focus groups, seven participants 
partook in the focus groups with the sixth focus group having a total of four participants. The mean total 
number of years involved in patient care across all six focus groups was 16.6 years (±10.6) and the mean 
number of years in the current position was 3.6 years (±3.6). The current positions held by the participants in 
the focus groups included community and district nurses, locality managers, community physiotherapists and 
occupational therapists, assistant practitioners, and a team leader of a care home team.  
Protocol 
Each focus group comprised of two consecutive components, where the focus of each component was on aspects 
and system structures that promote success (in line with the Safety-II definition) and aspects that could go 
wrong, influencing factors and possible weak signals present (in line with the Safety-I definition). Each 
component was approximately 45 minutes in duration with a 20-minute break between the two sessions. Prior to 
the start of the focus group, the project was described to the participants and the project information sheet, the 
informed consent sheet, as well as demographic information sheet was distributed among the participants, and 
returned before the start of the first component in the focus group.  
The emphasis of the first component in the focus group was on the elements of the discharge process that work 
well and improve patient safety. These questions were developed using the SEIPS 2.0 model by incorporating 
the work system elements (Holden et al., 2013) and based on literature on Safety-II. During the main discussion, 
the group was encouraged to develop a definition of a good discharge from the perspective of the staff as well as 
that of the patient. Participants were encouraged to discuss how stable their work conditions are, if their work 
requires a high degree of improvisation and how predictable the work situation is. Following the development of 
the definition, the discussion was guided by one of the researchers through the following series of questions: 
• What is the best way or optimal way to perform your work? What personal elements ensure a good 
discharge? (Person-related) What needs to be in place (requirements)? 
• What can happen unexpectedly during the task and how do you prepare for it? (Task-related) 
• Are tools in place that assist with this? (Tool-related) 
• What do you require from your team/unit for the discharge to be a success? 
(Team/group/unit/department) 
• What organizational elements assist in ensuring the discharge is a success? (Organizational factors) 
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The emphasis of the second component in the focus group was on the potential elements for error recovery and 
identification of weak signals. The main discussion was guided through the following series of questions by one 
of the researchers: 
• What could go wrong with this task? (Error) 
• What external factors would influence this task? (External Factors) 
• How do you know the task is going wrong? (Signals) 
• When you know it is going wrong, how do you correct yourself? Can you pre-empt the task? 
(Reaction/Monitoring) 
• Do you use this knowledge next time you do this task? (Learning) 
 
All focus groups were conducted using the question structure described above. The questions for the two 
components were used to loosely guide the discussion, but the participants were encouraged to freely discuss any 
topics that arose as a result of these questions. The discussions for both components of the focus groups were 
recorded using two audio recorders and one researcher recording field notes. During both discussions, one of the 
researchers compiled a summary of the key points raised by the group in the discussion on a white board or flip 
chart. The results were qualitatively analysed using a themantic analysis approach (Braun and Clarke, 2006) by 
identifying common themes across the groups and the signals identified were categorised using the SEIPS 2.0 
model. Ethical approval for this project was granted by the Loughborough University Ethics Approval (Human 
Participants) Sub-Committee and the Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust.  
RESULTS 
Framework 
This work draws on research from numerous fields, including human factors, strategic management theory, 
natural decision making theory as well as the concepts of safety-I and safety-II to expand the knowledge and 
understanding of weak signals.  The framework was developed for the analysis of weak signals in the context of 
the work, actions and events in the system in which they occur specific for the healthcare context and the 
preliminary framework is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: A conceptual framework for the investigation of weak signals within the healthcare context. 
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transformation-output model of healthcare professional performance (Karsh et al., 2006) in order to determine 
the aspects of the system from which the signals could originate. This model was selected as it provides a 
general multi-level model of a work system, as well as having considered open systems theory. The framework 
was then further expanded to incorporate more specific elements from the second version of the Systems 
Engineering Initiative for Patient Safety (SEIPS) model (Holden et al., 2013). The SEIPS 2.0 model was selected 
as it provides a framework for the analysis of processes and the relationship of various elements that occur in 
healthcare specifically (Carayon et al., 2006). 
The forms of the signals have been described in the framework as either being internal or external. An external 
signal may also generate an internal signal, but the external source or signal that causes the experience of an 
internal signal may not always be present or known. The external signals include visual, haptic, verbal, auditory 
or olfactory cues. The internal signals include the experience of a “hunch”, “vibe” or a general sense of 
“something going wrong”. Signal detection theory (Green and Swets, 1966) was included in the framework as it 
provides possible factors that may influence how a signal is perceived. These include the strength of the signal 
and the individual’s bias in perceiving the signal (McLeod, 2015). Theoretical concepts and models included to 
explain possible interpretation processes and mechanisms in the framework consist of the concepts of situation 
awareness (Endsley, 1995), sensemaking (Weick, 1995), naturalistic decision making (Zsambok & Klein, 1997), 
emotional attunement (Benner, Tanner, & Chesla, 1996) and the skill-rule-knowledge model of behaviour 
(Rasmussen, 1983). The skill-rule-knowledge model of behaviour (Rasmussen, 1983) was included as it may 
explain the processing and influence signals may have on performance. Signals can affect outcomes in that as a 
result of fixation (Reason, 1991) no action may be taken or alternatively a recovery strategy is implemented 
which may either result in an appropriate or inappropriate outcome. By considering the source and type of 
information these signals provide, insight regarding the status of the system and areas of risk may be revealed 
(Macrae, 2014a).  
Weak Signals 
In the second component of the focus group, participants were asked to discuss how they knew the discharge 
may not be going as expected and the signals that indicated this. Additonally it was discussed how they would 
respond to this and make an adjustment or adaptation they thought was necessary. These signals, if they are 
acted upon, have the potential to change the progression of the task and may assist in ensuring a successful 
outcome.  
The identified signals were analysed using the SEIPS 2.0 model by identifying from which element in the 
sociotechnical work system they originated. The sources of the signals could be categorized as the following 
elements from the work system: “person”, “tasks”, “tools” and “internal environment”. Examples identified in 
the focus groups and the categorization of these examples is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Examples of the signals identified in the focus groups and their classification with regards to the 
sociotechnical work system and from 
Example given Source (Sociotechnical Work System) Form 
Patient’s physical state 
For example: 
Patient does not look well 
Patient is not at the anticipated level 
Patient’s behaviour 
Cleanliness of Patient 
Work system: Persons Examples consist of external forms of 
signals including visual cues and olfactory 
cues, as well as internal forms such as 
cognitive cues. 
State of patient’s home 
For example: 
Untouched medication 
Cluttered environment 
Cleanliness of home environment 
Work system: Internal environment Examples consist of external forms of 
signals including visual cues and olfactory 
cues 
Family’s response 
For example: 
Numerous phone calls 
Family is intense or disengaged 
Family/Carers look as if they are not coping 
Family’s expectations 
Work system: Persons Examples consist of external forms of 
signals including visual cues and auditory 
cues. 
Patient documentation 
For example: 
Prior phonecall 
Referral 
Work system: Tools Examples consist of external forms of 
signals including auditory cues, as well as 
internal forms such as cognitive cues. 
Patient history 
For example: 
Previous experience with the patient 
Known psychological disorder 
Work system: Tasks Examples consist of internal forms of 
signals including cognitive cues. 
 
Examples of signals originating from “person(s)” in the system included the patient’s physical state and 
feedback from the patient and their family. This is highlighted by the following quote from one participant: 
“they’re [the patient] telling you they are not coping”. Additionally the indicators from feedback from the 
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family are highlighted by the following quote: “Just to add to that, the patient might tell you their fine, but then 
you might get a family member go… into the kitchen… and ‘can I have a word’. They will tell you they are fine 
but they are not”. Signals originating from the “internal environment” included the state of the patient’s home. 
Signals originating from the “tools” included the signals generated as a result of patient documentation such as 
the referrral form. The referral form may contain information that could possibly act as a warning signal to 
community staff prior to them visiting the patient, for example if the patient is a “high volume service user” with 
a history of failed discharges.  
Following this, the examples were classified into the different forms of signals according to the framework 
depicted in Figure 1. The examples related to the patient’s physical state that could be categorised as external 
included visual cues, for example seeing the patient does not look well, olfactory cues which would provide an 
indication of if the patient is not coping with tasks of daily living, such as personal hygiene. Internal signals 
identified included cognitive cues, for example the patient not being at the anticipated level of recovery. This 
type of signal was classified as internal, as it would have originated based on information processing from other 
external cues such as the documentation of the current state of the patient and the external visual cue that would 
then highlight the indiscrepancies between the two sources of information.  
The participants mentioned that they felt that the identification of these signals is a necessary component of their 
current work as their work requires them to adapt the patient’s treatment plan accordingly so that a readmission 
would not occur. In response to these signals, several participants mentioned that they would restructure their 
time, delegate work to other staff members and link in with other services to address the emerging issues. 
Additionally, they mentioned updating documentation, reporting back to the care teams, and setting up follow-
ups as possible response to the signals. In the groups, it was also mentioned that it was not always possible to 
respond to the signals identified. The final aspect discussed during the focus groups considered the potential 
learning opportunities and how one would pass the knowledge regarding signal identification on to more junior 
members. These included the need for reflection with different staff members, regular meetings to allow for 
feedback, team handovers to share best and worst practice, clinical supervision, and sharing experiences and 
information with different occupational groups.  
Safety I and Safety II Aspects 
The safety aspects discussed in the focus groups included aspects which could go wrong including errors, 
influencing factors and the various system elements that aid in task success. Common errors identified included 
errors relating to inappropriate or missing equipment, missing medication and inadequate packages of care. Error 
producing conditions identified by the groups consisted of a lack of communication between the different 
services involved in the process, and missing or incomplete information or documentation. An example of the 
effect and resulting problems a lack of communication can cause is highlighted in the quote: “patients gone 
home to a different place, can’t find your patient but you know they are out”. 
Potential factors that would influence the task and task-related behaviour identified by the groups included 
patient-related factors, time-related factors, and organizational factors. The organizational and managerial factors 
identified may not only influence the worker and task but also may affect an individual’s ability to adapt and 
adjust their performance. The elements that assist in promoting a good discharge were categorized according to 
the SEIPS 2.0 model, and the results for the different elements are depicted in Figure 2.  
Examples of work system elements that promote a good discharge categorized as person-related, included 
experience, open communication, ability to improvise, and having the confidence in asking questions. An 
example of open communication and the importance of it is highlighted by the following quote by one of the 
participants: “where there’s been some level of communication between where they’re coming from to where 
they’re going to ensures that there’s a smooth transition of care”. Additional examples categorized as person-
related included utilizing all available resources, understanding the job-roles of the individuals involved in the 
process, good team work and being proactive, for example by “chasing” discharges for that day in the morning. 
This is highlighted by the one participant: “I think for me its chasing up that discharge early in the morning, 
making sure its planned for that day. So now when we have future discharges I will ring in the morning to make 
sure all the plans are done and that they’ve not moved ward.”. Examples of task-related elements included the 
information provided during the task being up-to-date and accurate, effective cooperation and coordination 
between the services involved, good timing of tasks, for example other services are timeously informed about 
the discharge and ensuring cut-off times are considered and maintained to ensure patient safety, as well as the 
necessary and appropriate equipment being in place prior to the patient being discharged. Examples of tool-
related elements included well completed documentation forms including referrals, therapy forms and discharge 
letters, having access to computer records to access the latest information on the patient, and standard operating 
procedures. The standard operating procedures were described as an aid in specific cases in that it eased the 
discharge process across localities, which is explain in the following quote: “but sometimes you need to fall back 
on standard operating procedures so that you can kind of, everyone is going from the same sheet across the 
localities”. Examples of organization-related elements included organizational structures such as integrated 
teams, good intra-organizational communication and designated staff members, such as having a key contact 
person within the acute hospital. An example of how integrated teams promote a good discharge is highlighted 
in the following quote: “I think we all support each other and be in integrated teams and working with the 
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physios and OTs. You have got access to people, sending them [the patient] back into hospital is always going to 
be the last resort, it would be a visit of what can we get into place, what equipment can we get, who can we get 
involved to try keep them at home”. 
 
 
Figure 2: The categories of the results found for the different elements of the work system from the SEIPS 
2.0 model that promote a good discharge. 
CONCLUSION 
The method above qualitatively investigated Safety-I elements, signals as well as other Safety-II elements. The 
Safety-I elements addressed in this study included specific potential errors and error producing conditions related 
to the discharge process that may result in adverse events whereas the Safety-II elements investigated included 
signals, learning opportunities and work elements that may assist in task success. These Safety-II elements may 
aid in rendering a system more resilient by improving the ability to succeed under varying conditions (Hollnagel, 
2014). Additionally, weak signals may also provide a means for effective risk management in that they provide 
an opportunity to be proactive and identify aspects that threaten safety (Macrae, 2014a), and consequently one 
can respond to hazards earlier.  
The proposed method provides a preliminary basis for the investigation of signals and work elements that may 
aid in task success. The ramification and practical implication of this research is that it provides a basis for 
developing work processes so that current aspects that staff feel work well are incorporated into new procedures. 
Additionally incorporating Safety-II aspects when designing an intervention, whether it is a tool, training or 
redesigning a work process, by incorporating aspects staff feel work well, it may promote greater ownership of 
the intervention. The model on weak signals may assist in the development of a possible tool to triage and 
maybe highlight discharges that may be particularly difficult sooner rather than later.  
The participants provided positive feedback regarding the focus groups as a source of sharing ideas and as a 
platform to discuss task aspects that work well. Further investigations are required to identify additional 
elements that aid in task success as well as the factors that promote or inhibit signal identification.  
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Person-related: 
“Individual and Collective-level 
Characteristics” 
 
• Experience 
• Open communication 
• Ability to improvise 
• Confidence to ask questions and 
utilize all available resources 
• Understanding the different roles 
within the discharge process 
• Pro-activeness 
• Team work 
 
Task and Process-related: 
“Characteristics of Tasks” 
 
• Accurate information 
• Cooperation and coordination 
between services 
• Good handover between systems 
• Timing of tasks and visits 
• Having equipment available 
 
 
 
 
Tools: 
“Objects Used to Assist with Work” 
 
• Documentation forms 
• Access to computer records 
• Standard Operating Procedure 
Organization: 
“Work Structure and Management 
Characteristics” 
 
• Organizational structure  
• Intra-organizational communication 
• Designated staff members  
Elements of the 
Work System that 
promote a good 
discharge 
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